The Garden

I would like to talk a bit about what I will call a ‘non-physicalist’ position about the world.  As discussed in my previous post, a physicalist is one who holds that all physical events can be explained entirely by appeal to entirely physical causes.  A non-physicalist, then, would be one who holds that there are at least some physical events that cannot be explained by entirely physical causes.  Hence, a non-physicalist would entertain the possibility that some physical events might be caused by non-physical forces.  So, a non-physicalist is open to both physical and non-physical causes with respect to physical events.

One other position I would like to define is the ‘idealist’ position.  The idealist is basically opposit the materialist.  Where the materialist says that only physical causes account for physical events, the idealist says that only non-physical causes account for physical events.  In other words, where the materialist excludes all non-physical causes, the idealist excludes all physical causes.

Thus, we have a continuum of positions to consider when attempting to account for what we observe in our physical worlds:

Materialism–Physicalism–Non-Physicalism–Idealism

Where we choose to place our own beliefs on this continuum has sweeping consequences for how we subsequently interpret our world and choose to behave within it.   It shapes everything from political orientations, to attitudes about relationships, conceptions of self/identity, and overall assessments of meaning/purpose of life itself.  Needless to say, this is an immensely interesting subject and it will be worth our while to explore it carefully.

By my estimates, most people tend to hover somewhere around the middle of this continuum–embracing physical causes but wavering back and forth about the idea of non-physical causes.  Religious individuals tend to incorporate both types of causes into their world-views.  Individuals of a scientific mind-set, yet lacking rigorous scientific training, tend to also straddle both worlds of causes.  The strongest of the scientifically-minded tend to occupy the materialist position (for example Richard Dawkins).  There seem to be the fewest individuals occupying the idealist position however, as it appears to be the most counter intuitive.  My aim in this series is to discuss the merits of idealism in detail with the hopes of clarifying what problems exist for all the positions on this continuum, and to argue that there is good reason to suggest that there are in fact non-physical causes.

The term “materialism” and the term “physicalism” are closely related, but I would like to take a moment to define each as I use them.

Materialism refers to a belief about the world which holds that everything that exists, or everything that is real, is fundamentally material and governed by the laws of physical reality. It is a metaphysical position that attempts to define the scope of reality. A materialist, then, uses his view to assert that non-materialist propositions (such as the existence of spirits for example) do not exist and are therefore not part of reality.

Physicalism, in contrast, does not attempt to claim that non-physical propositions are false; instead, physicalism simply claims that if non-physical propositions are true, we cannot know them to be true. The physicalist therefore makes the following claim: For every physical event in the world, there is, in principle, a physical cause or set of causes that sufficiently accounts for the physical event in question. Nowhere, according to the physicalist, is it necessary to invoke non-physical entities or events to account for observable physical events; however, unlike the materialist, the physicalist would not assert that non-physical propositions must be false–they very well might exist, but they simply have no impact on physical reality. Physicalism is, therefore, primarily an epistemic position that deals with how we know rather than what we know; even though it has profound implications for the nature of reality.

In short, materialism makes a stronger claim about the world than physicalism does. The materialist denies the possible existence of non-physical reality whereas the physicalist simply claims that there is no need to assert the existence of non-physical realities–physical explanations are all we need to explain the world we observe.

These concepts are important to understand because they seek to define the scope of our reality. If one were to embrace materialism because the view seems intuitive after a cursory examination, then he or she runs the risk of cutting off a potential aspect of their reality that, ultimately, might be worth exploring. If, in fact, we find that there is good reason to suspect the existence of non-physical realities, it will become cumbersome to attempt to straddle both a desire to uphold one’s prior materialistic beliefs and the desire to explore the non-physical possibilities.

I will continue to expand on these concepts of physical reality with the aim of appreciating the challenges a non-materialst/non-physicalist might make. Check back soon for more…

There’s no doubt about the idea that our physical senses are powerful. We are incredibly adept at interpreting our environment through the five dominant sense organs of our bodies. But, should we take these powerful senses to be the very definition of reality?

The philosophical positions of “materialism” or “physicalism” are strong indicators of the logical extent to which these sense organs can dominate our world-views. These philosophical positions hold that all of reality only includes that which is physically extended in time and space. In other words, what is real is only what we can sensationally detect.

On what basis, though, are we justified in wholly negating the existence of a realm of non-physical reality? Surely it cannot be simply on the assumption that our sense organs are wholly complete “reality-observing” mechanisms. The mere existence of other animals with sense organs far surpassing the range of human perception demonstrates how insufficient our sensory apparatuses are at accounting for the whole of our reality. Why, then, is it nevertheless taken to be self-evident by the majority of the intellectual mainstream that considerations of non-physical realities are unimportant?

The more we seek wholly material explanations for apparently material events, the more we limit ourselves to the entire range of possibilities. What is wanted is a comprehensive understanding about the whole of reality; we want to interact with our realities as fully as possibly. To do this, I suggest we explore more seriously the possibility that there are non-physical realities in existence with which we interact. This theme will be further explored and clarified on this site in the near future. Stay tuned…