Dissecting Materialism
There’s no doubt about the idea that our physical senses are powerful. We are incredibly adept at interpreting our environment through the five dominant sense organs of our bodies. But, should we take these powerful senses to be the very definition of reality?
The philosophical positions of “materialism” or “physicalism” are strong indicators of the logical extent to which these sense organs can dominate our world-views. These philosophical positions hold that all of reality only includes that which is physically extended in time and space. In other words, what is real is only what we can sensationally detect.
On what basis, though, are we justified in wholly negating the existence of a realm of non-physical reality? Surely it cannot be simply on the assumption that our sense organs are wholly complete “reality-observing” mechanisms. The mere existence of other animals with sense organs far surpassing the range of human perception demonstrates how insufficient our sensory apparatuses are at accounting for the whole of our reality. Why, then, is it nevertheless taken to be self-evident by the majority of the intellectual mainstream that considerations of non-physical realities are unimportant?
The more we seek wholly material explanations for apparently material events, the more we limit ourselves to the entire range of possibilities. What is wanted is a comprehensive understanding about the whole of reality; we want to interact with our realities as fully as possibly. To do this, I suggest we explore more seriously the possibility that there are non-physical realities in existence with which we interact. This theme will be further explored and clarified on this site in the near future. Stay tuned…
December 7th, 2007 at 22:27
Excellent article. Research in this particular field is all too rare. I will await further insight into your ideas about the non-physical world that most certainly underlies physical reality.
December 17th, 2007 at 16:21
I read an interesting article in a back issue of Philosophy Now (from 2003…I will get you the citation) that basically argued the ‘materialist’ position boils down to the following: materialists are those who believe that reality is whatever physicists eventually tell us it is. At the moment, a ‘materialist’ working from cartesian physics and a ‘materialist’ working from quantum physics don’t have much in common other than an inordinate amount of faith in the power of physics, but they do both hold that faith.
December 31st, 2007 at 12:49
Hey, sounds like an interesting article (where did you find an ‘03 issue of Philosophy Now?). Isn’t it funny that the bottom line of a materialist position is still based on “faith?”
I don’t have a problem with “faith” per se, but I do have a problem with an unbalanced appreciation for, and application of, faith-based beliefs. If materialists are going to use faith to buttress their own beliefs about the world, it is only fair for them to appreciate its use for those of a non-materialist nature. So, if an idealist or a dualist proposes the existence of something beyond the range of normal human (5 sense) perception, the materialist cannot dismiss such a claim purely on the charge of “faith” alone.
All things considered, I think there is room for faith within reasoned beliefs. However, faith can still be subjected to some degree of reason–meaning not all faith-based beliefs are equally valid. I’ll have to work that out more formally somehow though.